Atheism or Calvinism?

The following is a piece written for Mars Hill, a philosophy discussion group I lead at Asbury Theological Seminary. I benefited greatly in writing this by the helpful criticisms of my friend, Adam, and the reflections of my former philosophy professor, Dr. Jerry Walls.

Atheism or Calvinism? Calvinism's Inescapable Epistemological Quandaries

In this paper I wish to explore the troubling epistemological and existential implications of Calvinism. In particular, I will argue for what many Christians, even of an Arminian stripe, might see as a shocking and counter-intuitive thesis, namely, that if one had to choose between atheism and Calvinism with their respective practical implications, atheism would clearly be the less unpalatable option (though, of course, still unpalatable). In order to substantiate this thesis, I will first identify what I understand to be the objectionable core of Calvinist thought. Next, I will draw out what I see as the frightening implications of Calvinism for our ability to arrive at the knowledge necessary to live happily both now and in eternity. Finally, I will compare this scenario with that of atheism and its implication of annihilation at death, hopefully showing that atheism is surprisingly head and shoulders above Calvinism in terms of worrisome existential implications.

To begin, let's get a clear definition of Calvinism on the table. I take it to be an irreducible component of traditional Calvinism that God unconditionally sends some persons to eternal hell. That is to say, their eternal misery is causally determined by God and His decrees in such a way that they cannot but sin and then go to hell for all eternity. Some tender-hearted Calvinists might resist such a stark and uncompromising statement of the implications of the (in)famed TULIP system of theology, but such implications follow necessarily from the combined doctrines of divine determinism and eternal hell. They are logically unavoidable; indeed, they amount to entailment. Many Calvinists have tried to resist the unpalatable conclusion of unconditional damnation while holding on to divine determinism and eternal hell by saying that God “passes over” the reprobate while he positively predestines the salvation of the elect. But the inexorable laws of logic make such resistance futile. So long as God’s actions are causally sufficient for the sin and damnation of the damned, he predestines them to hell in exactly the same strong sense that he predestines the saved to heaven. On determinism, it’s all the same.
For the sake of clarity, as well as to tickle my anti-Calvinism funny bone, let's call the doctrine that God causally determines the eternal misery of some people the Terrible Tenet. We can state this in propositional form as follows:

(TT) God causally determines some of His creatures to sin against Him and then suffer the eternal misery of damnation.

Reflect for a moment upon what it means for someone to come to believe this proposition (which is presumably believed on the basis of divine revelation). I take it to be uncontroversial that the vast majority of people would recognize (TT) as immoral. Indeed, unconditionally causing the misery of persons throughout eternity may be the most horrible act imaginable, made worse only by adding more persons to that unfortunate lot. Most Calvinists would likely agree that (TT) at least “looks” evil according to our deepest moral intuitions (they may inappropriately press the mystery button here to cover it up - a topic for another paper). But if this is true – that is, if our clearest moral intuitions run contrary to what God has revealed to be true – then we have what modern epistemologists often call a “defeater” for the reliability of our cognitive faculties aimed at moral beliefs. And though it is surely not an entailment, one might also argue that this serves as a defeater for other fundamental, basic, intuited beliefs, such as the laws of logic. For both basic moral beliefs and logical beliefs flow out of a similar, foundational, intuitive source. They are in the same broad category of basic beliefs. One cannot give an argument for them; they are simply self-evident, intuited beliefs that we rightly take to be true and properly basic in the absence of defeaters. And if logical intuitions are called into question, then a skeptical spiral ensues from which we can never recover (and, indeed, Calvinists often invoke the “noetic effects of sin” in this connection, and they are often more than willing to forfeit reason and logic when speaking of God’s “mysterious” (read: horrible or contradictory) actions).

But while I think the unreliability of our deepest moral intuitions at least suggests (though doesn’t entail) that other deep, foundational, intuited beliefs may also be wrong, my argument can proceed and go through only on the assumption that (TT) brings our deepest moral beliefs into question. In order to make this point crystal clear, believing in Calvinism requires persons to believe the following two propositions simultaneously:

(TT) God causally determines some of His creatures to sin against Him and then suffer the eternal misery of damnation.

and

(MI) My deepest moral intuitions judge (TT) to be clearly evil.

If (TT) is jettisoned, Calvinism is abandoned (and all Arminians shout with joy!). If (MI) is rejected, loud moral sirens should go off. If both are affirmed, moral skepticism invariably ensues, resulting in the following belief if one continues to believe (TT) with great firmness:

(MS) My deepest moral intuitions are unreliable.

At first glance, this might not seem all that consequential. After all, human judgments are often wrong about God, right? True enough, but when one’s clearest and deepest moral intuitions are abandoned, intractable epistemological, and thus existential, problems emerge. For if God reveals Himself (through Scripture and/or His actions in history) in a way that evinces a dubious or devious character according to our deepest moral intuitions, it is impossible to form rational trust in God’s good will towards anyone, including the elect. Why is this so? Well, because we come to know that a person is trustworthy by their actions and their character, and we arrive at these judgments through our moral intuitions. The assurances of a God who is or acts evil by the deepest (and only!) moral judgments available are not reassuring. They cannot reassure in principle. The best the Calvinist can do in the face of a God of dubious character is hunker down and hope for the best.

But surely things are not so bad for the elect, are they, who know by divine revelation and perhaps the witness of the Holy Spirit that they are elect and that God has promised to promote the happiness of the elect for all eternity? Actually, things are just as bad, for the elect cannot escape this epistemological quagmire so easily. Why can’t the Calvinist take recourse in a reliable divine revelation for the certainty of their future eternal bliss? Precisely because the nature of revelation in terms of truthfully conveying God’s true intentions cannot be separated from the moral question. Why not?

Well, what is revelation? Presumably, it is a communication or speech act from God to human beings, from a divine person (well, three persons) to human persons. What is needed for us to come to believe that God has communicated truth to us rather than lies? It’s one thing to come to believe that God has surely revealed something; it is quite another to come to believe that this communication is a true reflection of God’s intentions and will with respect to His promises (or commands). In order to come to trust a divine communication as truth-telling, the person giving the revelation must be judged by the person receiving it to be a trustworthy person. How is this judgment done? By looking at the character of the revealer and judging it trustworthy and thus not likely to lie. What this points up is that a God of dubious morality cannot be trusted to give a revelation that is an accurate reflection of His true intentions. We may have ways of coming to figure out that something is indeed a divine communication or revelation, but we do not have any good reason to believe that God won’t lie in this revelation given God’s actions in unconditional damnation. (Incidentally, this also shows that in order for a successful revelation to take place, we must have certain pre-revelation moral beliefs, a point made by Peter Geach). Therein lay Calvinism’s devastating epistemic effects.

So the main point sticks, even for the elect: a God of dubious character cannot be judged to give a trustworthy revelation, and thus even the elect person has strong reason to doubt the veracity of this and all other revelation (even if we know that it’s divine revelation), since God has shown Himself to act totally contrary to our clearest moral judgments with respect to unconditional damnation. If God has no qualms about unconditionally damning much of mankind, it would surely not be beyond His character to lie in His revelation, even if we know that it truly is a divine communication. Thus, even the elect must still live in perpetual fear, never knowing what God might do next. Eternal happiness becomes a will o’ the wisp, wishful thinking at best. Calvinism’s epistemological and existential problems seem beyond resolution. And I hasten to add that Reformed Epistemology, with its postulation of properly basic theistic beliefs, will not solve this problem. For a basic belief in God’s faithful truth-telling in His revelation cannot be sustained if one comes to hold (TT) and (MI). (MS) still results, no matter what category the belief is in.

And so where does this leave the Calvinist? Worse off, I maintain, than the atheist. Most atheists believe that we will not survive death; annihilation is our likely end. The point I want to make here is that once one is annihilated, all conscious existence is over. The universe cannot continue to torment you, and all suffering, no matter how severe, ends after a finite period of time. But if Calvinism is true – that is, if an all-powerful, perverse God exists – then there is no telling what He has in store for us throughout eternity, even for the elect. We become rats in an eternal cage of God’s own design. Who knows, maybe a thousand years down the road, God will damn every person He has created to hell for His own good pleasure. There is no way of knowing, and the only rational response available is something like hopeful fear. The main argument of my paper, if successful, shows that unless God proves Himself to be perfectly good and loving, an ongoing, happy, and fulfilling relationship with Him is impossible, both epistemologically, and, as a result, existentially.

And so, if faced with a choice between the twin specters of no God (atheism/annihilation) and an evil God (Calvinism), Atheism is immeasurably more desirable than Calvinism. Of course, the Calvinist always has recourse to the “His ways are above our ways” line of argument, but the careful observer will note that this is the very line of argument to which my line of argument speaks.

Faith, Boasting, and Calvinism

It's been quite a while since I have blogged; I hope not to have lost too many readers due to the sparse nature of my posts as of late. I would like to offer some reflections on a key point in the Calvinist/Arminian debate, indeed a point that is indicative of the broader relationship between such familiar theological themes as faith and works, human responsibility and divine grace, and so forth. It is so common that I believe it deserves to be exposed for the fallacy that it is.

Calvinists are notorious for decrying anything short of Calvinism as Pelagian or semi-Pelagian - that is to say, as affirming an inappropriate place for human working in salvation. They are often found saying that Arminians turn faith into a work that achieves or merits salvation, thus giving occasion for humans to boast before God, something the Pauline scriptures in particular clearly rule out. And no doubt, Calvinists are right to worry about illegitimate roles for works in salvation. Paul is very clear in Ephesians 2:8-10 that we are not saved by our works; rather good works are the fruit of salvation appropriated by faith. Indeed, the very need for divine salvation implies that humans cannot save themselves. They are bound to sin, enslaved to the Devil, and any moral bootstrapping is an impossible feat.

However, behind many Calvinist accusations of this sort lies the utterly unwarranted assumption that any human activity or work is cause for boasting. They are often found arguing that anything short of God "doing it all" leaves room, however slight, for human boasting with regard to salvation. This is a demonstrably false argument. One analogy is sufficient to show its speciousness. Imagine a child who, against the expressed will of his father, jumps out of their boat into the ocean. The child is unable to swim, and he begins to drown. The father then throws a life raft out to his son, to which the son clings tightly as the father drags him into the boat to save him. Can anyone seriously argue that the child has a cause for boasting merely because he stretched out his hands and clung to the provided means of salvation? Can anyone seriously imagine the son saying to the father, "I truly take credit for this saving effort, for unless I clung to the raft, I would not be saved. I take pride in my feat of self-salvation?" Such a scenario is preposterous, and it serves to illustrate the ridiculousness of the Calvinist argument that any work on our part is occasion for boasting. Surely some construals of human working would be inappropriate for a grace-based soteriology; for instance, if the child swam to the boat of his own strength and power, or if he somehow was able to merit his father's love in sending the life raft. But to say that anything we do must be understood as a cause of boasting is demonstrably false.

Biblical Arminians and other non-Calvinists who postulate faith as the means of salvation are arguing that salvation is analogous to the drowning child scenario. Salvation (ALL the gifts of grace, including the forgiveness of sins and the renewal of our nature unto true righteousness) is appropriated through persistent acts of humble faith. This "work" by itself accomplishes and effects absolutely nothing with regards to our salvation. It is merely the condition by which we are put in a position to receive the work of God in our souls. Humble faith by its very nature rules out boasting and pride, and it is only by humble faith that we are saved and enabled to love God and our neighbor.

Faith is a voluntary work on our part (often a painful work, as humility does not come easy), but it nevertheless leaves no room for boasting. It is an empty-handed, powerless surrender. Nor is it open to Calvinists to argue that being humble is something we can take pride in, for that is a self-contradiction. Humble faith by its very nature points beyond itself to a source of power and merit that is beyond the reach of human ability. The sooner Calvinists can grasp this, the sooner they will abandon one of the most popular reasons for being a Calvinist: the illusion that one must be a Calvinist to believe in salvation by grace through faith.

EDIT: In support of my view that faith is something we do, consider the following Scripture verse: "The work of God is this: to believe in the one he has sent" (John 6:29). Since the Bible teaches that faith is a "work" of some kind, yet also teaches that it is not something for which we can boast, then it must be that some actions we do leave no room for boasting. Faith is not a meritorious work nor something that itself effects/achieves salvation, but it is still a condition to receive salvation.

Freedom and Grace - Erasmus vs. Luther

For my Faith and Reason class, I have been assigned two small excerpts from the work of Erasmus and Luther, two thinkers at the time of the Reformation. One of their more famous disputations was on the matter of the will; Erasmus issued a tract entitled "The Freedom of the Will," whereas Luther issued one called "The Bondage of the Will.' Already from the titles, we can predict the general trajectory of the arguments of each of these theologians.

But in the small amount I've read, it seems to me that these two thinkers were talking past one another, as Christians often do in theological disputes. Much in this debate turns on definitions, and in this case we need to know what type of "freedom" we are talking about before we will ever have fecund discussion and debate.

It seems clear that both Erasmus and Luther affirm that apart from grace, we have no ability ("freedom") to choose the good and avoid evil. Luther, unlike Calvin, is even willing to prescribe human beings freedom (seemingly, in the libertarian sense of being able to choose otherwise) with respect to non-spiritual matters, even though the will is in bondage to sin with respect to spiritual matters - that is, unable to choose otherwise.

This debate brings us to the heart of the theological questions surrounding freedom of the will, sin, grace, and salvation. Most people in each orthodox theological party want to affirm that mankind is in bondage to sin, needing grace to be liberated from such slavery. Most want to affirm that man is in some sense responsible for their sin and for their salvation. But how can we hold the doctrines of original sin, the need for grace and faith, the command to obey and love, and human responsibility in tension?

I think the key is to define precisely what kind of freedom human beings have at this stage of the game in creation/redemptive history. The freedom we have is the freedom to receive and respond to the grace of God, itself restored by prevenient grace after the Fall of man. That is to say, we do not have unqualified libertarian freedom with respect to sin and holiness. How, then, can someone who is born into sin and who cannot do other than sin be held responsible? He is responsible for remaining in this state and willfully feeding his sinful nature rather than grabbing hold of grace to be freed from it. Luther is right that God commands impossibilities, deeds of obedience and love that are beyond our ability without the enabling power of the Spirit. Erasmus is right that by the light of prevenient grace, we may at least desire the good (because prevenient grace has restored a knowledge of the moral law, a conscience, and a measure of freedom to respond to further grace) and reach out for "peculiar" grace, as he styles it (what I would call sanctifying grace, the presence and power of the Spirit, not to be confused with prevenient grace) to renew our nature and subsequently empower our obedience.

Prevenient grace does not complete the circle of redemption in the sense that after its initial gift, we take over from there for our salvation. Even with prevenient grace, which at least in Wesleyan theology is a very specific kind of grace (as aforementioned, giving conscience, knowledge of the moral law, and a measure of freedom to respond to grace - not holiness), humans still find themselves in bondage, unable to free themselves by their efforts or works. This is why we need the crucial doctrine of faith alone, so that the law can drive people to radical faith in Christ (a kind of "work," a movement of the will, but a work that accomplishes nothing and is not to be equated with or stretched to include sanctification, good works, or love) to receive grace before any works of love or obedience are even possible. What God commands God offers grace for us to obey - but that grace must first be received, and we have to be careful not to overestimate the very limited powers of prevenient grace, lest we think no more grace must be received and the rest of the story is human working and response.

Human beings do not have the power to make themselves holy, nor can God impart that power. It is the work of God alone to sanctify, something we receive by painfully turning from our sin and handing our distorted nature over to God, both initially, progressively, and finally (although with the sanctifying presence of the Spirit, we can and must choose the good in order to remain in God's favor). Erasmus and Luther both want to affirm that apart from sanctifying grace, the will is in bondage to sin and cannot choose otherwise. Yet, human beings are still responsible because such grace is available to all people to receive. This last point is regrettably denied by Luther and the Calvinists, who maintain that God only makes this grace available to the elect. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Erasmus and Luther were much closer than they thought, as they both denied the ability to choose the good apart from grace. The freedom we have is the freedom to receive and respond to grace, a very limited freedom indeed. Would that more Arminians saw this truth today, for Calvinists often seem to be closer to it.

Spiritual Experiments

Hey bloggers and blog-readers! I'm not sure if anyone out there is still reading my blog, since my posts have been few and far between. I think it's time to make an entry.

I was assigned two chapters out of Richard Foster's "Celebration of Discipline," and I was pretty impressed with his insights. Consequently, I began reading the text from the beginning, and I have already stumbled upon more insightful nuggets. Here's one I'd like to share:

"Let me suggest an experimental attitude toward spiritual realities. Like any other scientific endeavor, we form a hypothesis and experiment with it to see if it is true or not. If our first experiment fails, we do not despair or label the whole business fraudulent. We reexamine our procedure, perhaps adjust our hypothesis, and try again. We should at least have the honesty to persevere in this work to the same degree we would in any field of science. The fact that so many are unwilling to do so betrays not their intelligence but their prejudice."

This quote was particularly striking to me because I have an agnostic scientist friend who once told me that he tried to pray to God in a time of personal need, but he received no answer. This was one of the principal reasons for his lack of belief in God. Now I don't want to take away from how painful such an experience can be - surely, it is painful. But with his scientific mind, if he really wanted to communicate with the Almighty, would one failed prayer experiment have been enough to convince a rational man that God does not exist? Why not try again? Why not question your methodology, or your assumptions, or your motives, or your hypothesis, or a whole host of other factors? Is it really scientific to give up so soon?

It took me years before I finally had a real spiritual contact with God, one that changed me pretty remarkably. It made me a debtor to grace, for I could not have effected the change that God effected in me by my own doing or works. I am daily a debtor, for God continues to sustain and change me. But for a while I was grasping and groping, yet holding on to the promise that those who seek shall find (Matt 7:7). The person who truly desires to know God and His righteousness will not give up until he/she finds God or finds out that God does not exist. Those who love the truth do not give up until they have been united to it. Why aren't we as persistent in our efforts to investigate spiritual realities as we are with our other pursuits of knowledge? What makes us think it would be easy to find God, that we wouldn't have to use a little trial and error? God wants us to seek Him, and rewards those who do so (Heb 11). He rewards them with Himself.

So what do you do

Simple question: What do you do to unwind?

I like to play video games with wacky friends and just totally be my insane self around people who thrive on insanity. This includes lunch tray sledding and Nerf gun fights (college). It also includes singing "In The Air Tonight" by Phil Collins, complete with an air-drum fill at the crucial part.

The Emotion Fallacy

I've noticed frequently in my life how quickly an emotional person is dismissed in rational discourse. If someone gets outwardly worked up about something, whether that passion is anger, joy, or what have you (all passions displayed by the Incarnate Son of God), their ability to think clearly and fairly is called into question. But while I realize that there is such a thing as a fallacious "appeal to emotion" in which one manipulates the emotions of another to win an argument rather than use logic, having an emotional or personal connection to a subject matter does not necessarily mean one carries baggage or bias. An emotional connection to a certain issue can be a source of bias, but so can a lack of emotional engagement.

Consider the testimony of a Holocaust victim. Undoubtedly, many Holocaust victims would not be able to talk about and evaluate their experiences without emotion, whether that emotion is sadness or anger. Are we to invalidate their viewpoint because of this, insisting that they cannot have a well-reasoned view of this event because their personal engagement necessarily constitutes "baggage" or bias? Obviously not. One can display immense passion in an issue and still be perfectly rational and objective in their assessment of it. Indeed, as I said before, a personal acquaintance with certain phenomena, along with an engaged emotional response, may be a pre-condition for properly and fairly understanding something. While we can be lead astray by our emotions and personal feelings, we can also be led astray by indifference or a lack of experience.

I suppose in our Postmodern age, our inclination in the face of someone who displays a personal connection with an issue they are discussing is to assume some past experience clouds their current judgment. Someone who responds emotionally cannot possibly be rational or objective, right? Well I disagree, and I think objectivity sometimes requires an emotional or personal connection. To know something first hand, so long as this is accompanied by a consideration of the wider wisdom of others as well as much personal reflection, is often an invaluable source of insight otherwise unobtainable. The bottom line is that someone can get worked up about something and still be as objective and rational as Mr. Stoic or the person who does not wear his/her emotions/passions on the sleeve.

A Failure to Own

I've encountered a certain phenomenon repeatedly in the extended theological reading, discussion, and debate I have participated in over the years. And no doubt, this issue is not limited to theological dialogue. You've heard of a failure to launch? Well, this is a failure to own.

There are many people who refuse to own or fully own the logical implications of their views. They refuse to be pinned with a certain label, even though that label accurately describes their view better than any other. They insist on holding on to theological concepts that simply do not fit into their system. They call their view one thing in order to keep it from being objectionable, but to all appearances it is clearly better known as something else. But if it walks like it duck, talks like a duck, and smells like a duck, then no matter what you want to call it, it's a duck.

Let me give two clear examples of this "finessing" phenomenon in theological conversation (not to be confused with being charitable or fair in interpretation - although which assessment is fair is itself frequently up for debate). Roman Catholic apologists are quick to point out that they believe in salvation by grace. And true enough, their official documentation at least gives lip service to grace. But in the very same documents (I have cited and analyzed their official documents here. While I'm grateful that many lay Roman Catholics depart from Rome, her theology remains official and informs her practice), we hear about "meriting eternal life" and "meriting the graces of sanctification" for ourselves and others. Are we really dealing with a biblical or a reasonable definition of grace at this point? Slapping "by grace" at the end of these phrases doesn't change their troublesome core; it actually just makes them self-contradictory if we have any meaningful definition of "salvation by grace" in play. God "graciously" gives me the power and the chance to earn my salvation and then "graciously" rewards me with eternal life in exchange for the condign merit I earn - does this theological obfuscation really change the unbiblical heart of Roman views on merit and salvation? No, it's still a duck. The gracious gift of eternal life and eternal life by the merit of works are mutually exclusive concepts.

My second example comes from my debates with Calvinists. Calvinists love to tell you they believe in human responsibility and free will, but the reality is that they do not. Or more accurately, their versions of these concepts are so void of the meanings that we normally ascribe to them that they cease to be appropriate words. The fact is, Calvinists refuse to own the troublesome implications of their views. Without the ability to respond, Calvinism simply has no way of affirming human responsibility and true free will. Calvinism requires a thoroughgoing determinism. No matter how loudly or passionately you protest to the contrary, it's still a duck.

Many, no doubt, do not see that their views land them in unwanted territory. I'm sure we all have views that have negative implications we don't notice. As a result, we should be gracious with others and their views. Where the point is when it becomes willful blindness, I do not pretend to know. I do not believe human beings are able to make such judgments about the heart. But let's try to be honest and own the implications of our views, or own labels that are far more accurate. Maybe then we'll be forced to stand under the truth and let is shape us.